‘As regards Egypt, both the New York Times’ and the Washington Post’s main stories corroborated and detailed the gist of what I have been saying over the past week or two: the military is negotiating the results of the presidential election. It is trying to work a deal in a situation where it holds most, but not all, of the leverage.’
‘The way things stand now, Morsi is supreme over the façade of the Egyptian state, but the SCAF rules the “deep state.” This resembles in some ways the situation in Turkey from the mid-1920s all the way into the 1990s (not that Egyptians deliberately modeled the current mess after the Turkish experience). Thus arrangements like this can last a long time—or not. Time will tell’
And as Garfinkle points out, the U.S. has almost zero say in what happens. A previous post on here was perhaps giving the Muslim Brotherhood (out of fear of dealing with a Brotherhood led Egypt) too much credit. Perhaps also the leading edge of Western involvement to change Egypt (however much it could) was a more liberal internationalist, coalition-based, often hopelessly protest-based vision of liberal democracy coming to Egypt. This will validate, for some, such an approach (the Arab Spring worked!…the Arab world has tilted toward greater freedom and human rights) come what may.