Is it something deeper than mere political correctness?
The attitude of students toward free expression is not simply a patchwork ofpolitically correct views, but something substantial and more worrying: An alternative understanding of free speech that is essentially “the right to non-offensive speech.” Overall, young adults tend not to believe that there is dissonance between being generally supportive of speech and regulating speech that is offensive to particular groups.’
Broad liberties mean specific responsibilities in upholding those liberties, with a lot of helpful guidance from our founding documents.
The young usually take what is most meaningful in their lives from how adults in their lives behave (parents, relatives, (older) friends, teachers, mentors, bosses, people with any authority/influence…interpreting for themselves over time and through experience what ought to be most important and honored, respected and doubted, ignored and gotten beyond, etc):
I suspect a main message for many young people nowadays is how to extend freedom to ever more individuals and groups, and be sensitive to these individual and group needs and wants.
But what kind of authority might this require, if it is in fact a correct interpretation?
As previously posted:
Brendan O’Neill At Spiked: ‘Why We Must Fight For Free Speech For People We Loathe:‘
‘A true devotee of freedom of speech says, ‘Let everyone speak, because it is important that all sides are heard and that the public has the right to use their moral muscles and decide who they trust and who they don’t’. The new, partial campaigners for friends’ speech effectively say, ‘Let my friend speak. She is interesting. She will tell the public what they need to hear.’ These are profoundly different positions, the former built on liberty and humanism, the latter motored by a desire to protect oneself, and oneself alone, from censorship. The former is free speech; the latter ‘me speech’.
Hmmm…let’s hope this ain’t happening:
“The Peloponennisian War created the sorts of tension in Athens that would appear to support Thucydides’ analysis. Obligations to the community required greater sacrifice and presented a clearer conflict with the self-seeking “Homeric” pursuit of one’s status, power and pleasure. In political terms, people had to decide whether or not to plot against the democracy to bring off an Olgarchic coup. In moral terms they had to decide whether or not to ignore the demands of the community, summed up in the requirements of “justice,” in favor of their own honor, status, power, and in general their perceived interest. Plato was familiar with people who preferred self-interest over other-regarding obligation; his own relatives, Critias and Charmides, made these choices when they joined the Thirty Tyrants.
Arguments from natural philosophy did not restrain people like Critias and Charmides. Democritus argues unconvincingly that the requirements of justice and the demands of nature, as understood by Atomism, can be expected to coincide. Protogoras rejects the view that moral beliefs are true and well grounded only if they correspond to some reality independent of believers; admittedly they are matters of convention, but so are all other beliefs about the world. This line or argument removes any ground for preferring nature over convention, but at the same time seems to remove any rational ground for preferring one convention over another.”