Alim Remtulla At The American Interest: ‘Kandahar’s Warrior Poets’

August 6, 2011August 7, 2011 / chr1 / Leave a comment

Can they become a professional Army?:

“It will not be until 2014, perhaps 2016, that the Afghan government can provide essential services to the country, says the CSIS report. In the meantime, it will be up to the military to fill the void. As it stands, the army is already delivering aid, health care, infrastructure and governance, not to mention police work.”

and a best case scenario?:

‘This is not necessarily a problem, said former Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West in a 2010 New York Times op-ed. West argues that as the United States begins to withdraw from Afghanistan, the business of nation-building should bypass the ineffectual and possibly corrupt Presidential Palace and be placed squarely in the lap of the military. “Although isolating Mr. Karzai will strike many as a giant step backwards, the truth is that we don’t have a duty to impose democracy on Afghanistan”, he wrote. “[A] diminished Hamid Karzai can be left to run a sloppy government, with a powerful, American-financed Afghan military insuring that the Taliban do not take over.’

As our author points out, this would be the current model in troubled Pakistan. It likely serves Obama’s political interest, and arguably the national interest, to try and make the Afghan Army look good about now, despite their capabilities.

The Taliban are biding their time. Karzai is of questionable leadership capability (manic-depressive), and leads a quite corrupt government with roots in tribal loyalties, nepotism, graft (less morally troublesome for many if taken from an occupying army), and the extreme poverty of a country torn by war for generations. The border with the FATA region of Pakistan is porous, and many of the same basic conditions on the ground haven’t changed much. The American interest is still in dismantling conditions that led to this region being a base of operations for terror attacks. European and coalitional support is still mild, and politically weak.

There are a lot of good reasons to be skeptical…and mostly pessimistic.

Addition: A U.S. helicopter was shot down and 31 U.S. special operations troops killed on their way to a mission in Eastern Afghanistan today. R.I.P.

…Repost-’Dexter Filkins In The NY Times: The Long Road To Chaos In Pakistan’

From The WSJ: ‘Pakistan Tells U.S. to Halt Drones’

April 15, 2011April 15, 2011 / chr1 / Leave a comment

Full article here.

Relations are not good at the moment, as popular sentiment is very much against us:

‘The U.S. strategy in the war in Afghanistan hinges on going after militants taking refuge in Pakistan. The breakdown in intelligence cooperation has cast a pall over U.S.-Pakistani relations, with some officials in both countries saying intelligence ties are at their lowest point since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks spurred the alliance.’

Of course, we need this cooperation to succeed, and The Pakistani state is likely quite involved with terrorism.

From The AfPak Channel At Foreign Policy: ‘Spy For A Spy: The CIA-ISI Showdown Over Raymond Davis’…From Foreign Policy: ‘Taseer’s Murder Another Sign Of The Dysfunctional Pakistani State’

Repost-‘Dexter Filkins In The NY Times: The Long Road To Chaos In Pakistan’

March 7, 2011March 7, 2011 / chr1 / Leave a comment

Full article here. (Filkins’ piece published 09/27/08)

The FATA area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan is mostly lawless and ungoverned. What’s more, Filkins argues, is that the Taliban operating there has continually been propped up by the Pakistani government:

“The origins of the present predicament date to 1994, when Pakistan, unnerved by the bloody civil war that had engulfed Afghanistan following the Soviet Union’s departure five years earlier, turned to a group of fierce but moralistic Afghan tribesman who had won a string of victories.”

Why? In part because of the politics of not just Pakistan, but the region:

“The single most persuasive explanation for Pakistan’s continued involvement with the Taliban is the country’s obsession with India. Pakistan and India have fought three major wars since they broke with the British Empire in 1947, and the rivalry lives on. India has allied itself closely with the Afghan government of Hamid Karzai.”

We’re mulling over (now signed) nuclear arms deal with India. Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association discusses some potential consequences of this deal here.

We’ve also been sending billions in aid to a now deposed military leader, who while perhaps having had reasonable control of his country (and perhaps some interest in serving his people)…also played us quite well.

“It may be that the Pakistan Army is too inept to destroy the Taliban, but there is abundant evidence suggesting that at least some elements of the army do not want to do that. “

And no doubt, many of the Pakistani people don’t want to do that either, as Musharraf made a risky move. Leaders can’t be (or be seen to be) too far from the interests of their own people for too long.

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And how is the current government handling the old feudal system, the floods, economic growth…as well as the FATA region?

Any thoughts and comments are welcome.

by Ilyasansri

From Newsweek: Henry Kissinger ‘Deployments And Diplomacy’

October 16, 2009October 18, 2009 / chr1 / 1 Comment

Full article here.

“The prevailing strategy in Afghanistan is based on the classic anti-insurrection doctrine: to build a central government, commit it to the improvement of the lives of its people, and then protect the population until that government’s own forces are able, with our training, to take over.”

But despite our efforts (we have been misallocating resources…largely due to the Iraq War ), the central government we helped to build is mired in corruption. And I suspect it isn’t just the Karzai government that’s corrupt, but the corruption is due to other more fundamental issues which our military may not be able to address. The basic levels of national identity, economic and educational development as well as infrastructure (the ring road?) may not have been met to build a functioning government for which the worst Afghans can lay down their weapons (or be forced to by an Afghan military)

Kissinger finishes with:

“For the immediate future, it is essential to avoid another wrenching domestic division and to conduct the inevitable debate with respect for its complexity and the stark choices confronting our country.”

But our domestic political divisions include a reasonable debate about whether or not the broader goals (a viable Afghan government, or something holding Afghanistan together beyond the Taliban’s version of Islam) can be reached by the military (and those who likely have the best understanding of what’s going on on the ground).

It’s still stark…and can any sitting U.S. president allow the chance of Al-Qaeda (and even Bin Laden) to come back…?

Addition: Pakistani troops take action in South Waziristan.

Dexter Filkins Book On Afghanistan And Iraq: “The Forever War”

June 3, 2009 / chr1 / Leave a comment

His webpage here. (where his book can be found)

Filkins has spent a long time in Afghanistan, Iraq and other places in the Middle and Far East as a reporter for the NY Times. He’s a good writer, knows his subjects and spends a lot of time on the ground. He doesn’t hold much back.

A good interview with Filkins on NPR can be found here (without excessive focus on women’s rights and other topics that are as much a part of the lens with which we look at Afghanistan as I imagine Afghanistan is in itself…).

From Foreign Policy Via Arts & Letters Daily: The Idiot’s Guide To Pakistan

May 11, 2009May 12, 2009 / chr1 / Leave a comment

Full guide here.

After reading, I’m still a little confused. Our most clear interest is in preventing the region from becoming a haven for those terrorists who seek attacks on civilians around the world (a place from which a potential terrorist attack on U.S. soil couldn’t politically be allowed to happen, let alone morally if there was knowledge aforehand).

Yet, we have a porous Afghan/Pakistani border, tribal and ethnic loyalties as well as conflicts, a corrupt Afghani government next door, the Taliban, Al-Quaeda in the mix, the Pakistani military (with divided loyalties), a weak Pakistani government with nuclear capabilities and a hatred for India…

Promote economic development in the face of extreme poverty, lack of education and violent militias seeking pure religious rule? Engage and try and stabilize Afghanistan with the military and then…?

A Few Thoughts On The FATA Region Of Pakistan

December 28, 2008December 28, 2008 / chr1 / Leave a comment

– It’s tough to see how any US foreign policy decisions could effectively address and ameliorate the freedom fighter/holy warrior code by which many local and non-state actors currently live in the FATA region.

– Do we continue to justify killing them with our military force if they pose a legitimate threat to our security? Do we try and generate a multi-lateral force to do so?

– Should we try and and drive a wedge between the locals and the non-state actors (if so, would the Bush administration’s definition of terrorism be sufficient to do so and how far does it extend?).

– How actively do we also try and allign our interests with the current/any Pakistani government in hopes of strengthening the Pakistani state (potentially killing such men with Pakistan’s military force, or better yet, having a unified Pakistan gradually censure the extremists reasons to be?).

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– In addition, there’s not just a nuclear threat by non-state actors involved here, but also a nuclear threat by state actors…India and Pakistan…that we have to negotiate.

See Also: A Yale Page On The Foreign Policy Challenges we face there. A good article linked to here originally published in the Christian Science Monitor. Philip Bobbitt Discusses His Book ‘Terror And Consent’ On Bloggingheads

Addition: The Atlantic has a piece about Samuel Huntington’s recent death and life’s work.

Dexter Filkins In The NY Times: The Long Road To Chaos In Pakistan

October 4, 2008April 20, 2009 / chr1 / Leave a comment

Full article here.

Why? In part because of the politics of not just Pakistan, but the region:

We’re mulling over a nuclear arms deal with India. Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association discusses some potential consequences of this deal here.

“It may be that the Pakistan Army is too inept to destroy the Taliban, but there is abundant evidence suggesting that at least some elements of the army do not want to do that. “

It reminds me that the conventional wisdom on Bush foreign policy is still reasonably accurate: He really thought that inside other peoples is a little American waiting to get out.

I may agree with Bush that freedom is a universal ideal, but his pursuit of that ideal has been narrow, idealistic, and simplistic.

by Ilyasansri